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Abstract
In problems of choosing ‘aspirations’ for TU-games, we study two axioms, ‘MW-consistency’
and ‘converse MW-consistency.’ In particular, we study which subsolutions of the aspiration
correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MW-consistency. We also provide
axiomatic characterizations of the aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus.
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1 . Introduction
A transferable utility coalitional game (TU-game, for short) associates with each
coalition of agents a real number representing what the coalition can achieve on its own,
its ‘worth’. Given a class of TU-games, a ‘solution’ associates with each game in the
class a non-empty set of payoff vectors. The analysis of TU-games proposes solutions
that answer two basic questions:
(i) Which coalitions form?
(ii) What is the payoff of each member of a coalition that forms?
Most studies on TU-games, however, assume that the grand coalition eventually
*Corresponding author. Fax: 181-298-53-6611.
¨E-mail addresses: hokari@social.tsukuba.ac.jp (T. Hokari), ozgur@sabanciuniv.edu (O. Kıbrıs).
0165-4896/02/$ – see front matter   2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00085-9
¨314 T. Hokari, O. Kıbrıs / Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 313–331
forms. Then, the analysis reduces to answering question (ii), that is, determining the
payoff distribution for the grand coalition.
In this paper, we do not presuppose the formation of the grand coalition and study
those solutions that, in a sense, simultaneously answer both questions (i) and (ii). An
‘aspiration’ for a given game is a payoff vector that summarizes predictions about which
coalitions are likely to form and what the resulting payoffs of their members will be. For
each agent i, let x be a payoff that she demands in return for her cooperation. Then, it isi
natural to assume that a coalition S forms only if the demands of its members are jointly
compatible, namely, (x ) is feasible for S. A payoff vector x is an aspiration if noi i[S
coalition can improve upon its component of x, and for each agent i, there exists at least
one coalition for which agent i’s demand x is jointly compatible with those of otheri
members.
Studies of coalitional games have revealed that the set of aspirations is closely related
to the outcomes obtained from two alternative approaches: the ‘multi-coalitional
1bargaining approach’ and the ‘noncooperative approach’.
In the multi-coalitional bargaining approach, each coalition is assigned a set of
attainable payoffs and a ‘bargaining solution’, which is interpreted as summarizing the
bargaining process among the members of that coalition. The disagreement point in each
coalition’s bargaining problem is determined endogenously as the expectation of each
member on what she can obtain from alternative coalitions. A payoff vector x is a
‘multi-coalitional bargaining outcome’ if, for each coalition S, (x ) is chosen by thei i[S
assigned bargaining solution for the bargaining problem with the disagreement point
associated with x. It so happens that every multi-coalitional bargaining outcome is an
aspiration. Conversely, each aspiration can be obtained as a multi-coalitional bargaining
outcome for some initial specification of bargaining solutions.
In the non-cooperative approach, versions of the following coalition formation game
are analyzed: a randomly chosen agent proposes a coalition to be formed and a feasible
payoff distribution for its members. The proposal is accepted if every member of the
coalition agrees upon it. Otherwise, in the next period the first agent who rejected the
proposal makes a new proposal. The game ends when a proposal is accepted. It turns out
that the set of aspirations of the original coalitional game is equal to the set of stationary
2
subgame perfect equilibrium proposals of this non-cooperative game.
Its relation to the bargaining and non-cooperative approaches strongly suggests that
the set of aspirations is an appropriate object to focus on if one wants to analyze
coalitional games without imposing the assumption that the grand coalition eventually
forms. Let us refer to the solution that assigns to each game its set of aspirations as the
‘aspiration correspondence’. In the literature, several subsolutions of the aspiration
correspondence have been studied. We are interested in their properties. In particular, we
3focus on two properties: ‘consistency’ and ‘converse consistency’.
1See Bennett (1983) for more detail.
2The particular non-cooperative game described here is due to Selten (1981). The literature following the
original paper includes Chatterjee et al. (1993), Perry and Reny (1994), and Moldovanu and Winter (1994b,
1995).
3See Thomson (1996) for an extensive survey of studies on these properties applied to various models of game
theory and economics.
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Consistency deduces from the desirability of a payoff vector in a game the desirability
of its restrictions to all subgroups of agents in the associated ‘reduced games’. Suppose
that a set of agents N is facing a game and a payoff vector x is agreed upon. Suppose
then that some agents leave. Then let us reevaluate the situation from the viewpoint of
the remaining agents N9. Namely, for each coalition S#N9, let us identify what S can
obtain without any help from other members of N9. In this context, since any agent i in
N\N9 has agreed upon x, it seems natural to assume that she will be willing to cooperate
with S if offered x . Additionally, suppose that S can choose such ‘partners’ from N\N9.i
Then the revised worth of S would be the maximal (total) payoff that S can obtain in this
manner. This operation defines a game in which the set of agents is N9. We refer to this
game as an ‘MW-reduced game’ since it was introduced by Moldovanu and Winter
4(1994a) and Winter (1989). ‘MW-consistency’ states that, in this reduced game, the
original agreement should be confirmed, namely, (x ) should be agreed upon.i i[N 9
Converse consistency deduces the desirability of a payoff vector in a game from the
desirability of its restrictions to all pairs of agents in the associated two-agent reduced
games. Consider a game for N and a payoff vector x under evaluation. Suppose that for
each pair of agents hi, jj in N, (x ,x ) is chosen for the MW-reduced game associated withi j
x and hi, jj. ‘Converse MW-consistency’ states that, in such a situation, x should be
chosen for the original game.
On the domain of all TU-games, the aspiration correspondence and the partnered
aspiration solution satisfy both MW-consistency and converse MW-consistency (Mol-
dovanu and Winter, 1994a; Winter, 1989). In this paper, we analyze which other
subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse
MW-consistency. Moreover, we obtain axiomatic characterizations of two solutions: the
aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic concepts and
notations used later on. In Section 3, we study which subsolutions of the aspiration
correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MW-consistency. In Section 4,
we provide axiomatic characterizations of the aspiration kernel and the aspiration
nucleolus. In Section 5, we give some remarks on the non-transferable utility case.
2 . Preliminary
There is an infinite set of ‘potential’ agents, indexed by the members of the set N of
natural numbers. Let 1 denote the set of non-empty and finite subsets of N. Given a
A
countable set A, let R denote the Cartesian product of uAu copies of the set R of real
numbers, indexed by the members of A. We use , for strict set inclusion and # for
N
weak set inclusion. To simplify the notation, given N[1, x[R , and S#N, we often
write x ; (x ) and x(S) ;o x .S i i[S i[S i
Given N[1, a transferable utility coalitional game for N (TU-game for N, for short)
4In the standard approach, the way of reevaluating the situation of the remaining agents we described above
was first introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965). For the coalition of all remaining agents, its revised worth
in the standard approach is defined to be the worth of the original grand coalition minus the sum of payoffs
assigned for those agents who left.
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Nis a function v : 2 →R with v(5)5 0. For each S#N, the number v(S) represents what
N
coalition S can obtain on its own, its ‘worth’. Let 9 denote the class of all TU-gamesall
Mfor N, and 9 ; < 9 .all M[1 all
N NGiven N[1 and v[9 , a payoff vector x[R is individually feasible in v if forall
each i[N, there exists S#N such that i[ S and x(S)# v(S). It is coalitionally rational
Nin v if for each S#N, x(S)$ v(S). An aspiration for v is a payoff vector in R
satisfying individual feasibility and coalitional rationality.
N NGiven N[1, v[9 , and x[R , the set of generating coalitions for v and x,all
denoted &#(v,x), contains those coalitions whose members’ promised payoffs in x are
jointly compatible:
&#(v,x) ;hS#N u x(S)# v(S)j.
Thus, if each agent demands her component of the payoff vector, the generating
coalitions are the only coalitions that are likely to form. In an aspiration for the game,
each agent is a member of at least one generating coalition and each generating coalition
distributes payoffs efficiently among its members.
NA solution on 9 is a correspondence from 9 to < R that associates withall all N[1
N
each N[1 and each v[9 a non-empty set of payoff vectors satisfying individualall
feasibility. We use w to denote a generic solution.
3 . Consistency and converse consistency
N NGiven N[1, v[9 , x[R , and N9,N, the MW-reduced game of v relative to xall
x
and N9, denoted r (v), is defined by setting for each S#N9N 9
max [v(S<T )2 x(T )], if S± 5,
x T#N \N 9r (v)(S) ;HN 9 0, if S5 5.
‘MW-consistency’ (Moldovanu and Winter, 1994a; Winter, 1989) states that if a
payoff vector is chosen for a game, then the restriction of it to any subgroup should be
chosen for the associated MW-reduced game (see Fig. 1).
NMW-consistency. For each N[1, each v[9 , each x[w(v), and each N9,N, weall
xhave x [w(r (v)).N 9 N 9
‘Converse MW-consistency’ (Moldovanu and Winter, 1994a; Winter, 1989) states that
if a payoff vector for a game is such that its restriction to any pair of agents is chosen for
the associated two-agent MW-reduced game, then it should be chosen for the original
game.
N NConverse MW-consistency. For each N[1, each v[9 , and each x[R , if forall
x
each N9,N with uN9u5 2, we have x [w(r (v)), then x[w(v).N 9 N 9
On 9 , the ‘aspiration correspondence’ (Albers, 1979; Bennett, 1983; Cross, 1967)all
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Fig. 1. Aspirations in three-agent TU-games. Let N5 h1,2,3j, v(h1j)5 v(h2j)5 v(h3j)5 0, v(h1,2j)5 6,
v(h1,3j)5 5, v(h2,3j)5 7, v(N)5 0. The set of aspirations for v is the union of the three thick line segments in
(b).
and the ‘partnered aspiration solution’ (Albers, 1979; Bennett, 1983) are MW-consistent
and conversely MW-consistent (Moldovanu and Winter, 1994a; Winter, 1989). It follows
from this result that each of these two solutions is the unique MW-consistent and
conversely MW-consistent extension of its two-agent version to the n-agent case.
In the following subsections, we introduce other subsolutions of the aspiration
correspondence that have been studied in the literature, and check which of them
satisfies MW-consistency and/or converse MW-consistency.
3 .1. Balanced aspiration solution
NGiven N[1, a collection @ # 2 of coalitions is weakly balanced on N if there
exists a list of non-negative weights (d ) such that for each i[NS S[@
O d 5 1.S
S[@
S]i
It is strictly balanced on N if, in addition, all weights are positive.
Cross (1967) and Bennett (1983) argue that the competition among the coalitions for
‘scarce’ agents leads to a balanced structure of the generating coalitions, by driving up
the payoff demands of these agents and driving down the payoff demands of others. The
following solution is based on this idea:
NBalanced aspiration solution, BalAsp. For each N[1 and each v[9 , BalAsp(v) isall
the collection of aspirations x for v such that &#(v,x) is weakly balanced on N.
Proposition 3.1. On 9 , the balanced aspiration solution is MW-consistent.all
NProof. Let N[1, v[9 , x[BalAsp(v), and @ ;&#(v,x). Then there existsall
@(d ) [R such that for each i[NS S[@ 1
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O d 5 1.S
S[@
S]i
xLet N9,N and @ 9;&#(r (v),x ). Since the aspiration correspondence is MW-N 9 N 9
x
consistent, x is an aspiration for r (v). For each S[@ 9, letN 9 N 9
l ; O d .S S<T
T#N \N 9
s.t. S<T[@
@ 9Then (l ) [R and for each i[N9S S[@ 9 1
O l 5 O O d 5O d 5 1.S S<T R
S[@ 9 S[@ 9 T#N \N 9 R[@
S]i S]i R]is.t. S<T[@
xThus, @9 is weakly balanced on N9 and, hence, x [BalAsp(r (v)). hN 9 N 9
The following example shows that the balanced aspiration solution violates converse
MW-consistency.
Example 3.1. Let N ;h1,2,3j. Consider the following TU-game: for each S#N
1, if uSu5 2,
v(S) ;H0, otherwise.
Let x ; (1,1,0). Then x is an aspiration for v and &#(v,x)5 hh1,3j,h2,3j,h3jj. Note that
the aspiration correspondence and the balanced aspiration solution coincide in the
two-agent case (Fig. 2). Therefore, as the aspiration correspondence is MW-consistent,
xfor each N9,N with uN9u5 2, we have x [BalAsp(r (v)). However, since &#(v,x) isN 9 N 9
not weakly balanced, we have x[⁄ BalAsp(v).
3 .2. Aspiration kernel
Next, we turn to a solution that is similar to the prekernel (Maschler et al., 1972).
N NGiven N[1, v[9 , x[R , and i, j[N with i± j, letall
s (v,x) ;max [v(S)2 x(S)].ij S]i
S]⁄ j
The number s (v,x) represents the maximum ‘surplus’ that agent i can obtain without theij
cooperation of agent j, supposing that other agents agree upon x. For each game v, the
aspiration kernel (Bennett, 1981) chooses those aspirations that equalize these surpluses
for each pair of agents.
NAspiration kernel, AspKer. For each N[1 and each v[9 , AspKer(v) is theall
collection of aspirations x for v such that for each S[&#(v,x) and each pair i, j[ S, we
have s (v,x)5 s (v,x).ij ji
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Fig. 2. The aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus in two-agent and three-agent TU-games. In these
cases, the aspiration kernel coincides with the aspiration nucleolus. (a) If v(h1,2j)$ v(h1j)1 v(h2j), they select
the ‘standard solution’ payoff vector: each agent is given first her individual worth, and then what remains is
divided equally. (b) Otherwise, they select (v(h1j),v(h2j)). In panels (c) and (d), v(h1,2,3j)5 0 and the payoff
vector chosen by them is indicated as x*.
The next lemma is due to Peleg (1986), and it essentially implies that the aspiration
kernel is MW-consistent and conversely MW-consistent.
N NLemma 3.1. For each N[1, each v[9 , each x[R , each N9,N, and each pairall 1
xi, j[N9, we have s (r (v),x )5 s (v,x).ij N 9 N 9 ij
Proposition 3.2. On 9 , the aspiration kernel is MW-consistent and converselyall
MW-consistent.
NProof. (MW-consistency) Let N[1, v[9 , x[ AspKer(v), and N9,N. Since theall
x
aspiration correspondence is MW-consistent, x is an aspiration for r (v). Let S[N 9 N 9
x x&#(r (v),x ) and i, j[ S with i± j. Then, by the definition of r (v)(S), there existsN 9 N 9 N 9
xT #N\N9, where T may be the empty set, such that x(S)# r (v)(S)5 v(S< T )2 x(T ).N 9
Since x[ AspKer(v), S< T [&#(v,x), and i, j[ S< T, we have s (v,x)5 s (v,x). Byij ji
x xLemma 3.1, s (r (v),x )5 s (r (v),x ).ij N 9 N 9 ji N 9 N 9
N N(Converse MW-consistency) Let N[1, v[9 , and x[R be such that for eachall
xN9,N with uN9u5 2, x [ AspKer(r (v)). Since the aspiration correspondence isN 9 N 9
conversely MW-consistent and the aspiration kernel is its subsolution, x is an aspiration
for v. Let S[&#(v,x) and i, j[ S with i± j. Then x 1 x # v(S)2 x(S\hi, jj)#i j
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x x x
r (v)(hi, jj) and, hence, hi, jj[&#(r (v),x ,x ). Since (x ,x )[ AspKer(r (v)), wehi, j j hi, j j i j i j hi, j j
x xhave s (r (v),x ,x )5 s (r (v),x ,x ). By Lemma 3.1, s (v,x)5 s (v,x). hij hi, j j i j ji hi, j j i j ij ji
3 .3. Aspiration nucleolus
Next, we analyze a solution which is closely related to the prenucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969).
NN 2 \h5jFor each x[R , let e(v,x) be the vector in R defined by setting for each
NS[ 2 \h5j, e (v,x) ; v(S)2 x(S). The number e (v,x) represents the dissatisfaction of SS SuN u2 21in v at x. Also, let u(e(v,x))[R be obtained by rearranging the coordinates of
e(v,x) in non-increasing order.
m 9Given m[N and z,z9[R , z is lexicographically smaller than z9 if either (i) z , z1 1
9 9or (ii) there exists k. 1 such that z , z and for each , , k, z 5 z .k k , ,
For each game, the aspiration nucleolus (Bennett, 1981) selects a payoff vector that
lexicographically minimizes the dissatisfactions of the coalitions over the set of
aspirations.
NAspiration nucleolus, AspNuc. For each N[1 and each v[9 , AspNuc(v) is theall
unique aspiration x for v such that for each other aspiration y for v, u(e(v,x)) is
lexicographically smaller than u(e(v,y)).
The aspiration nucleolus is a subsolution of both the aspiration kernel and the
balanced aspiration solution (Sharkey, 1993).
N NGiven N[1, v[9 , x[R , and a [R, letall
6 (v,x) ;hS,N u e (v,x)$aj.a S
5The following lemma is a characterization of the aspiration nucleolus.
NLemma 3.2. (Sharkey, 1993) For each N[1, each v[9 , and each aspiration x forall
v, x5 AspNuc(v) if and only if for each a [R with 6 (v,x)± 5, 6 (v,x) is strictlya a
balanced on N.
We use Lemma 3.2 to prove the following result:
Proposition 3.3. On 9 , the aspiration nucleolus is MW-consistent.all
Proof. Let N[1, v[9 , x ; AspNuc(v), and N9,N. Since the aspiration corre-all
x
spondence is MW-consistent, x is an aspiration for r (v). Let a [R be such thatN 9 N 9
x x x6 (r (v),x )± 5. By the definition of r (v), for each S[6 (r (v),x ), there existsa N 9 N 9 N 9 a N 9 N 9
xT #N\N9, where T may be the empty set, such that r (v)(S)5 v(S<T )2 x(T ). SinceN 9
v(S<T )2 x(T )2 x(S)$a, 6 (v,x)± 5. To simplify the notation, let @ ;6 (v,x) anda a
5A similar characterization of the (pre)nucleolus is due to Kohlberg (1971).
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x@ 9;6 (r (v),x ). By Lemma 3.2, @ is strictly balanced on N. Thus, there exists aa N 9 N 9
list (d ) of positive weights such that for each i[NS S[@
O d 5 1.S
S[@
S]i
For each S[@ 9, let
l ; O d .S S<T
T#N \N 9
s.t. S<T[@
As shown above, for each S[@ 9, there exists T #N\N9 such that S<T [@. Thus, for
each S[@ 9, l . 0. Note also that, for each i[N9S
O l 5 O O d 5O d 5 1.S S<T R
S[@ 9 S[@ 9 T#N \N 9 R[@
S]i S]i R]is.t. S<T[@
Thus, @9 is strictly balanced on N9. Since this is true for each a [R with
x x6 (r (v),x )± 5, by Lemma 3.2 we have x 5 AspNuc(r (v)). ha N 9 N 9 N 9 N 9
As the following example shows, the aspiration nucleolus violates converse MW-
consistency.
Example 3.2. Let N ;h1,2,3,4j. Consider the following TU-game for N: for each S#N
6, if S[ hh1,2,3j,h1,2,4jj,
v(S) ;H0, otherwise.
Let x ; (3,3,0,0) and y ; (2,2,2,2). It can be shown that x[ AspKer(v), y is an
aspiration for v, and e(v,y) is lexicographically smaller than e(v,x). Thus, x±
AspNuc(v). Since the aspiration kernel is MW-consistent and it coincides with the
aspiration nucleolus in the two-agent case, for each pair i, j[N
x x(x ,x )[ AspKer(r (v))5 hAspNuc(r (v))j.i j hi, j j hi, j j
Thus, x satisfies the hypothesis of converse MW-consistency for the aspiration nucleolus.
However, we have x± AspNuc(v). h
3 .4. Equal gains aspiration solution
The next subsolution of the aspiration correspondence is based on the premise that
agents when bargaining tend to share the gains equally. In our context, by forming a
coalition, the agents forego the payoffs that they could have attained by forming
alternative coalitions. Therefore, each agent’s largest payoff from alternative coalitions
N N
serves as an ‘outside option’. Formally, given N[1, v[9 , x[R , S[&#(v,x),all
and i[ S, the outside option for i relative to v, x, and S is defined by
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Sd (v,x) ;max [v(T )2 x(T \hij)].i T]i
T±S
NEqual gains aspiration solution, EqAsp. For each N[1 and each v[9 , EqAsp(v)all
is the collection of aspirations for v such that for each S[&#(v,x) and each pair i, j[ S,
S S
we have x 2 d (v,x)5 x 2 d (v,x).i i j j
Note that the aspiration kernel is a subsolution of the equal gains aspiration solution.
As the following example shows the equal gains aspiration solution violates MW-
consistency.
Example 3.3. Let N ;h1,2,3j. Consider the following TU-game: for each S#N
6, if S[ hh1,2,3j,h1,2jj,
v(S) ;H0, otherwise.
Let x ; (4,2,0). Then x is an aspiration for v and
&#(v,x)5 hh3j,h1,2j,h1,2,3jj.
Note that
h1,2j
x 2 d (v,x)5 2 max [v(S)2 x(S)]5 2maxh02 4,02 4,62 6j5 0,1 1 S]1
S±h1,2j
h1,2j
x 2 d (v,x)5 2 max [v(S)2 x(S)]5 2maxh02 2,02 2,62 6j5 0,2 2 S]2
S±h1,2j
h1,2,3j
x 2 d (v,x)5 2 max [v(S)2 x(S)]5 2maxh02 4,62 6,02 4j5 0,1 1 S]1
S±h1,2,3j
h1,2,3j
x 2 d (v,x)5 2 max [v(S)2 x(S)]5 2maxh02 2,62 6,02 2j5 0,2 2 S]2
S±h1,2,3j
h1,2,3j
x 2 d (v,x)5 2 max [v(S)2 x(S)]5 2maxh02 0,02 4,02 3j5 0.3 3 S]3
S±h1,2,3j
Thus, x[EqAsp(v). Note that
x
r (v)(h1j)5maxhv(h1j),v(h1,3j)2 x j5maxh0,02 0j5 0,h1,2j 3
x
r (v)(h2j)5maxhv(h2j),v(h2,3j)2 x j5maxh0,02 0j5 0,h1,2j 3
x
r (v)(h1,2j)5maxhv(h1,2j),v(h1,2,3j)2 x j5maxh6,62 0j5 6.h1,2j 3
x xSince EqAsp(r (v))5 h(3,3)j, we have (x ,x )[⁄ EqAsp(r (v)).1,2 1 2 1,2
Proposition 3.4. On 9 , the equal gains aspiration solution is conversely MW-all
consistent.
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N NProof. Let N[1, v[9 , and x[R be such that for each N9,N with uN9u5 2,all
x
x [EqAsp(r (v)). Note that the aspiration kernel and the equal gains aspirationN 9 N 9
solution coincide in the two-agent case. Since the aspiration kernel is conversely
MW-consistent, x[ AspKer(v). Since AspKer(v)#EqAsp(v), we have x[
EqAsp(v). h
4 . Two axiomatic characterizations
In this section, we study the implications of MW-consistency, converse MW-consis-
tency, and the following three basic axioms:
Equal treatment of equals. For each N[1, each v[9 , and each pair i, j[N, if forall
each S#N\hi, jj, v(S< hij)5 v(S< h jj), then for each x[w(v), x 5 x .i j
N MAnonymity. For each N,M[1 with uNu5 uMu, each v[9 , each w[9 , and eachall all
bijection b : N →M, if for each S#N, w(hb(i) u i[ Sj)5 v(S), then
Mw(w)5 hx[R u there exists y[w(v) such that for each i[N, x 5 y j.i b(i )
N NZero-independence. For each N[1, each pair v,w[9 , and each y[R , if for eachall
S#N, w(S)5 v(S)1o y , then for each x[w(v), x1 y[w(w).i[S i
Table 1 summarizes which solutions satisfy which properties.
As mentioned in the Introduction, most studies on coalitional games assume that the
grand coalition eventually forms. In this ‘standard approach’, a notion of reduced games
N N
was first introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965). Given N[1, v[9 , x[R , andall
N9,N, the DM-reduced game of v relative to x and N9 is defined by setting for each
S#N9
Table 1
Properties of subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence on the domain of all TU-games. Asp and ParAsp
denote the aspiration correspondence and the partnered aspiration solution, respectively.
Domain: 9 Asp ParAsp BalAsp AspNuc AspKer EqAspall
Equal treatment of equals No No No Yes Yes Yes
Anonymity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zero-independence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Single-valuedness No No No Yes No No
MW-consistency Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
(Proposition 3.1) (Proposition 3.3) (Proposition 3.2) (Example 3.3)
Converse Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
MW-consistency (Example 3.1) (Example 3.2) (Proposition 3.2) (Proposition 3.4)
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max [v(S< T )2 x(T )], if S[⁄ hN9,5j,
T#N \N 9
x
rˆ (v)(S) ; v(N)2 x(N\N9), if S5N9,N 9 5
0, if S5 5.
Associated axioms of consistency and its converse are defined as follows.
NDM-consistency. For each N[1, each v[9 , each x[w(v), and each N9,N, weall
x
ˆhave x [w(r (v)).N 9 N 9
N NConverse DM-consistency. For each N[1, each v[9 , and each x[R withall
x
ˆx(N)5 v(N), if for each N9,N with uN9u5 2 we have x [w(r (v)), then x[w(v).N 9 N 9
NGiven a game v for N, a preimputation for v is a payoff vector x[R with
x(N)5 v(N). For each game v, the prekernel (Maschler et al., 1972) chooses those
preimputations that equalize the surpluses for each pair of agents. On 9 , the prekernelall
is the only subsolution of the preimputation correspondence satisfying equal treatment of
equals, zero-independence, DM-consistency, and converse DM-consistency (Peleg,
1986). It so happens that a similar result holds for the aspiration kernel.
Theorem 4.1. On 9 , the aspiration kernel is the only subsolution of the aspirationall
correspondence satisfying equal treatment of equals, zero-independence, MW-consis-
tency, and converse MW-consistency.
Proof. Clearly, the aspiration kernel is a subsolution of the aspiration correspondence
satisfying equal treatment of equals and zero-independence. By Proposition 3.2, it also
satisfies MW-consistency and converse MW-consistency.
Conversely, let w be a subsolution of the aspiration correspondence satisfying the four
axioms. Clearly, w coincides with the aspiration kernel in the two-agent case. Let N[1
N
with uNu$ 3, and v[9 . First, we show that w(v)# AspKer(v). Let x[w(v). Byall
xMW-consistency of w, for each N9,N with uN9u5 2, we have x [w(r (v))5N 9 N 9
xAspKer(r (v)). Since the aspiration kernel is conversely MW-consistent, x[ AspKer(v).N 9
Next, we show that AspKer(v)#w(v). Let y[ AspKer(v). Since the aspiration kernel
is MW-consistent, for each N9,N with uN9u5 2
y yy [ AspKer(r (v))5w(r (v)).N 9 N 9 N 9
Since w is conversely MW-consistent, y[w(v).
Altogether, w(v)5 AspKer(v). h
For each game, the prenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) selects a payoff vector that
lexicographically minimizes the dissatisfactions of the coalitions over the set of
preimputations. On 9 , the prenucleolus is the only subsolution of the preimputationall
correspondence satisfying single-valuedness, anonymity, zero-independence, and DM-
consistency (Sobolev, 1975).
It turns out that, by using Lemma 3.2 and by following the argument in Sobolev
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(1975), one can obtain a similar axiomatic characterization of the aspiration nucleolus.
(Since the proof is very long, we provide it in Appendix A.)
Theorem 4.2. On 9 , the aspiration nucleolus is the only subsolution of the aspirationall
correspondence satisfying single-valuedness, anonymity, zero-independence, and MW-
consistency.
5 . Remarks on the NTU-case
The definitions of the aspiration correspondence, the partnered aspiration solution, the
balanced aspiration solution, and the equal gains aspiration solution have been
generalized to define corresponding solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional
games (NTU-games, for short).
Moldovanu and Winter (1994a) study MW-consistency and converse MW-consistency
on the domain of all NTU-games. They show that, on this domain, both the aspiration
correspondence and the partnered aspiration solution satisfy these two properties. Here,
6
we report, without proofs, two additional results:
• On the domain of all NTU-games, the balanced aspiration solution satisfies MW-
consistency.
• On the domain of all NTU-games, the equal gains aspiration solution violates
converse MW-consistency.
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A ppendix A
In this appendix, we provide the proof of Theorem 4.2. As mentioned before, the
proof is similar to that of a theorem in Sobolev (1975), which is written in Russian. The
proof of Sobolev’s theorem (in English) can be found in Peleg (1988). Essential parts of
Peleg’s proof are reproduced in Snijders (1995).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Clearly, the aspiration nucleolus is a subsolution of the
6The proofs are available from the authors on request.
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aspiration correspondence satisfying single-valuedness, anonymity, and zero-indepen-
dence. By Proposition 3.3, it is also MW-consistent.
Conversely, let w be a subsolution of the aspiration correspondence satisfying the four
N
axioms. Let N[1, v[9 , and x ; AspNuc(v). We show, in seven steps, thatall
x5w(v).
Let
A ;ha [R u there exists S,N such that a 5 e (v,x)j,S
uAu
and (a ,a , . . . ,a )[R be the enumeration of A with a .a . ? ? ? .a . To1 2 uAu 1 2 uAu
simplify the notation, for each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, we write 6 ;6 (v,x). Also, for eachk akik[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj and each i[N, let 6 ;hS[6 u i[ Sj. Given k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, byk k
Lemma 3.2, 6 is strictly balanced on N. Moreover, the associated weights can bek
chosen to be rational. Thus, there exist a natural number m and a list of natural numbersk
(m ) such that for each i[N, o m 5m . Let @ be the partition of N such thatiS S[6 S[6 S k kk k i jfor each pair i, j[N, there exists B[@ with i, j[B if and only if 6 56 . Letk k k
b ; max uBu, g ;o m , andk B[@ k S[6 Sk k
gk
l ; .S Dk mk
MkStep 1. Given k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, we construct M [1 and 7 # 2 \hM ,5j that satisfyk k k
the following conditions:
(i) N#M ;k
(ii) uM u5b ? l ;k k k
(iii) for each S[6 , there exists T [7 such that S# T;k k
(iv) for each S#N and each T [7 , if S# T, then T >N5 S and S[ S ;k k
i j i i(v) for each i[M , we have u7 u5m and uh j[M u 7 57 ju5b , where 7 ;k k k k k k k kjhT [7 u i[ T j and 7 ;hT [7 u j[ T j.k k k
Let (B ,B , . . . ,B ) be an enumeration of @ . For each h[ h1,2, . . . ,l j, we1 2 u@ u k kk
construct a set D of agents as follows:h
• if h# u@ u and uB u5b , then let D ; B ;k h k h h
• if h# u@ u and uB u,b , then let D be the union of B and (b 2 uB u) agents chosenk h k h h k h
from N\N;
• if h. u@ u, then let D be a set of b agents chosen from N\N.k h k
Since @ is a partition of N and the set of potential agents is countably infinite, it is cleark
that, in the above construction of D ’s, we can make them mutually exclusive. Then, leth
M ; D <D < ? ? ? <D .k 1 2 lk
Note that hD ,D , . . . ,D j is a partition of M . By construction, M satisfies conditions1 2 l k kk(i) and (ii).
Next, imagine that there are g empty ‘rooms.’ We will fill these rooms withk
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(appropriately replicated) groups in hD ,D , . . . ,D j, and each room will correspond to1 2 lk
an element of 7 . For each S[6 , create m copies of the setk k S
< D .h
h[h1, . . . ,u@ ujk
s.t. D >S±5h
Since the total number of these copies is g 5o m , we can put them into differentk S[6 Sk
rooms. Recall that for each i[N, o m 5m . This implies that for each h[iS[6 S kk
h1, . . . ,u@ uj, group D belongs to exactly m rooms. Next, for each h[ hu@ u1k h k k
1, . . . ,l j, create m copies of D . Sincek k h
gk
l 5 ,S Dk mk
we can place these copies of D , . . . ,D into the rooms so that all g rooms containu@ u11 l kk k
the same number of groups and for each h[ hu@ u1 1, . . . ,l j, group D belongs tok k h
exactly m rooms. It is easy to see that 7 thus constructed satisfies conditions (iii), (iv),k k
and (v). (The above construction of M and 7 is illustrated in Fig. 3 for a simple case.)k k
Fig. 3. Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 4.2. In the above example, N5 h1,2,3,4j, 6 5k
hh1,2,3j,h1,2j,h3,4j,h3j,h4jj, m 5 3, m 5m 5m 5 1, m 5m 5 2. Thus, b 5maxh2,1j5 2, g 5k h1,2,3j h3,4j h3j h12j h4j k k
11 11 11 21 25 7, and
g 7kl 5 5 5 35.S D S Dk m 3k
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Step 2. Given k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, let $ ;hD ,D , . . . ,D j, M , and 7 be constructedk 1 2 l k kk
as in Step 1. We show that, for each pair i, j[M , there exists a permutation p on Mk M kk
such that p (i)5 j and for each T [7 , p (T )[7 .M k M kk k i jLet i, j[M . By condition (v) of T in Step 1, u7 u5 u7 u5m . Thus, there exists ak k k k k
i jpermutation p on 7 such that p (7 )57 . Note that 7 has a property that if m7 k 7 k k k kk k
distinct coalitions in 7 are chosen, then there exists exactly one group in $ that isk k
included in all of these m coalitions. Thus, p induces a permutation on $ . Formally,k 7 kk
this permutation, denoted p , is defined by setting for each D[$$ kk
p (D) ;> p (T ).$ 7k kT[7k
T$D
Note that each coalition in 7 can be viewed as a coalition of groups. For each T [7 ,k k
its image under p is defined by$k
p (T ) ;< p (D).$ $k kD[$k
D#T
Now, we show that for each T [7 , p (T )[7 . Let T [7 . Then, by the definitionk $ k kk
of p , for each D[$ with D#T, we have p (D)#p (T ). Thus,$ k $ 7k k k
p (T )5< p (D)#p (T ).$ $ 7k k kD[$k
D#T
Since
g 2 1kuT u5 up (T )u5 up (T )u5 ,S D$ 7k k m 2 1k
we have p (T )5p (T ). Thus, p (T )[7 .$ 7 $ kk k k
By construction, each group in $ contains exactly b agents. For each D[$ withk k k
i[D, choose a bijection p : D →p (D) such that p (i)5 j. For each D[$ withD $ D kk
i[⁄ D, choose an arbitrary bijection p : D →p (D). Given the list (p ) of suchD $ D D[$k k
bijections, define the permutation p on M by setting for each D[$ and each h[D,M k kk
p (h) ;p (h). Clearly, p (i)5 j. Let T [7 . ThenM D M kk k
p (T )5< p (h)5< < p (h)5< p (D)5p (T )[7 .M M D $ $ kk k k kh[T D#T h[D D#T
Thus, p is a desired permutation on M .M kk
Step 3. For each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, let M and 7 be constructed as in Step 1. Here, wek k
M
construct a set M and a partition of 2 \hM,5j.
Let
M ; M 3M 3 ? ? ? 3M .1 2 uAu
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In order to stress the fact that M is a Cartesian product of the sets of agents, we write
its subsets and its elements in bold face. Note that, since the set of potential agents is
countably infinite, in the presence of anonymity, M can be viewed as an element of 1.
For each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, let
S ;hS,M u there exists T [7 such thatuAu11 k
S5M 3 ? ? ? 3M 3 T 3M 3 ? ? ? 3M j.1 k21 k11 uAu
Let
uAu
M S S DDS ; 2 \ hM,5j< < S .uAu11 k
k51
Step 4. We show that for each pair i, j[M, there exists a permutation p on M suchM
that (i) p (i)5 j and (ii) for each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAu1 1j and each S[S , we haveM k
p (S)[S .M k
Let i5 (i ,i , . . . ,i )[M and j5 ( j , j , . . . , j )[M. By Step 2, for each k[ h1,1 2 uAu 1 2 uAu
2, . . . ,uAuj, there exists a permutation p on M such that p (i )5 j and for eachM k M k kk k
T [7 , p (T )[7 . Define the permutation p on M by setting for each h5k M k Mk(h ,h , . . . ,h )[M1 2 uAu
p (h) ; (p (h ),p (h ), . . . ,p (h )).M M 1 M 2 M uAu1 2 uAu
Clearly, p (i)5 j and for each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj and each S[S , we have p (S)[S .M k M k
uAuNote that p induces a permutation on < S . Thus, also for each S[S ,M k51 k uAu11
p (S)[S .M uAu11
MStep 5. Let w[9 be defined as follows: (i) w(M) ; v(N)2 x(N); (ii) for eachall
k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj and each S[S , w(S) ;a ; and (iii) for each S[S , w(S) ;k k uAu11
minha ,v(N)2 x(N)j. We show that for each i[M, w (w)5 0.uAu i
Let i, j[M. By Step 4, there exists a permutation p on M such that p (i)5 j, andM M
Mfor each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAu1 1j and each S[S , we have p (S)[S . Let w9[9 bek M k all
21defined by setting for each S#M, w9(S) ; w((p ) (S)). By anonymity, w (w)5w (w9).M i j
uAu11 MLet S,M. Since < S 5 2 \hM,5j, there exists k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAu1 1j such thatk51 k
21S[S . Since (p ) (S)[S , by the definitions of w and w9, w9(S)5w(S). Clearly,k M k
w9(M)5w(M). Thus, w95w. Therefore, w (w)5w (w9)5w (w).i j j
The above argument can be applied to all i, j[M. Since x is an aspiration for v, x is
individually feasible and coalitionally rational. By coalitional rationality, for each
k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, a # 0. Together with individual feasibility, we have either a 5 0 ork 1
v(N)5 x(N). Thus, we have (i) for each S#M, w(S)# 0, and (ii) there exists T #M
such that T ± 5 and w(T )5 0. Let i[T. Then, since w(w) is coalitionally rational in w,
05w(T )#O w (w)5 uT u ? w (w),j i
j[T
so that w (w)$ 0. By individual feasibility of w(w), w (w)5 0.i i
Thus, for each i[M, w (w)5 0.i
Step 6. Let
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M9;h(i,i, . . . ,i)[M u i[Nj.
Clearly, uM9u5 uNu. Let b : N →M9 be the bijection defined by setting for each i[N,
w (w)b(i) ; (i,i, . . . ,i). We show that for each S#N, r (w)(b(S))5 v(S)2 x(S).M 9
Let S,N. Then there exists k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj such that v(S)2 x(S)5a . Byk
properties (iii) and (iv) of 7 in Step 1, there exists T [7 such that T >N5 S. Letk k
R ; M 3 ? ? ? 3M 3T 3M 3 ? ? ?M .1 k21 k11 uAu
Then b(S)#R. Moreover, since T >N5 S, we have R\b(S)#M\M9. Thus,
w (w)
r (w)(b(S))5 max w(b(S)<Q)$w(b(S)< (R\b(S)))5w(R).M 9 Q#M\M 9
Since R[S , w(R)5a . Thus,k k
w (w)
r (w)(b(S))$w(R)5a 5 v(S)2 x(S).M 9 k
Now, we claim that the opposite (weak) inequality also holds. Let Q#M\M9. If
b(S)<Q[S , then w(b(S)<Q)5a #a 5 v(S)2 x(S). If there exists , # uAuuAu11 uAu k
such that b(S)<Q[S , then there exists T 9[7 such that, ,
b(S)<Q5M 3 ? ? ? 3M 3T 93M 3 ? ? ? 3M .1 ,21 ,11 uAu
Since Q#M\M9 and S#T 9, we have T 9>N5 S. Thus, by property (iv) of 7 in Step,
1, we have S[6 , so that w(b(S)<Q)5a 5 v(S)2 x(S)., ,
Thus, for each Q#M\M9, we have w(b(S)<Q)# v(S)2 x(S). This implies that
w (w)
r (w)(b(S)5 max w(b(S)<Q)# v(S)2 x(S).M 9 Q#M\M 9
By the definition of w, w(M)5 v(N)2 x(N). For each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, by the
definition of 6 , we have N[⁄ 6 . Thus, for each k[ h1,2, . . . ,uAuj, by property (iv) ofk k
7 in Step 1, there exists no T [7 such that T $N. This implies that, for each S$M9,k k
we have S[S , so thatuAu11
w(S)5minha ,v(N)2 x(N)j# v(N)2 x(N).uAu
Thus,
w (w) w (w)
r (w)(b(N))5 r (w)(M9)5 max w(M9<Q)5 v(N)2 x(N).M 9 M 9 Q#M\M 9
Therefore, for each S#N
w (w)
r (w)(b(S))5w(S)2 x(S).M 9
w (w)Step 7. By max consistency, for each i[M9, w (r (w))5 0.i M 9
Finally, by anonymity and zero-independence of w, we deduce that, for each i[N,
w (w)w (v)5w (r (w))1 x 5 01 x 5 x .i b(i ) M 9 i i i
Thus, w(v)5 AspNuc(v). h
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